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HIS January, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argu-
ment in appeals from two controversial "right to die" cases; deci-
sions in the cases are expected by the end of the term.1 The Ninth
Circuit case held that Washington's ban on assisted suicide, including
physician-assisted suicide, violates the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment by impermissibly limiting the liberty rights of termi-
nally ill patients to choose the manner of their dying. 2 The Second
Circuit case held that New York's similar ban on assisted suicide violates
the equal protection rights of those terminally ill persons who could not
choose to end their lives by withdrawing or withholding medical care. 3
These cases have attracted a great deal of public attention and contro-
versy, both about the role of courts in adjudicating cases that raise com-
plex moral issues, and about the underlying moral issues themselves.
These controversies in turn raise deep questions about the status of the
moral and the legal claims they invoke. In Law and Truth, Dennis Patter-
son argues for a limited notion of truth in law;4 this Article argues that
Patterson's view is too limited to account for appeals to truth in complex
moral cases such as the aid in dying decisions.
Consider the following questions about the status of the moral and
legal claims in the aid in dying cases. Did either of the circuit court deci-
sions rest on true propositions of law? Are the panoply of briefs filed in
the cases arguing about truth in law, or about something quite different-
say, politics or ethics? What would the claim to legal truth in such cases
even mean, and why make it at all? Would the claim to truth mean, for
* Ph.D., Philosophy, University of Michigan (1974), J.D., University of Utah (1981);
Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law, University of Utah. I am grateful to my
colleagues Peter Appleby, Dan Greenwood, Bruce Landesman, Michael McConnell,
Cindy Stark, and Nicholas White, for discussion of an earlier draft of this paper.
1. During this time this Article went to press, the Supreme Court issued its opinion.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110, 1997 WL 348094 (U.S. June 26, 1997).
2. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied,
85 F.3d 1440, rev'd sub nor., Washington v. Glucksburg, No. 96-110, 1997 WL 348094
(U.S. June 26, 1997).
3. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom., Washington v.
Glucksberg, No. 96-110, 1997 WL 348094 (U.S. June 26, 1997).
4. DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996).
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example, more than the Holmesian prediction of what the Supreme
Court will do in fact when it hands down its decision? Could either of the
circuit court decisions nonetheless rest on true propositions of law if it is
overruled by the Supreme Court? What, if any, are the relationships be-
tween claims to truth in law and claims to truth in ethics? If the court
decisions employ ethical precepts, what is the status of these precepts?
Are they matters of opinion, preference, truth? Does their truth status
change in virtue of their having been invoked by courts? Are the legal
and moral claims in the cases fundamentally different in kind from the
fact claims in the cases, such as whether aid in dying has been recently
before the legislature, or whether doctors currently engage in the
practice?
The view developed by Patterson in Law and Truth is that truth claims
in law involve warranted assertability. Patterson's fundamental position
is that if the Ninth or the Second Circuit relied on recognized patterns of
legal argument in reaching the conclusions they did, they asserted legal
truths. If they relied on new, different, untried, or unrecognized patterns
of argument, they did not assert legal truth. This essay argues that Patter-
son has opened the issue of legal truth in an enormously important way.
In the end, however, he has misunderstood what some modern defenders
of ideas of legal truth assert, and his position relinquishes much that is
significant about truth claims in law. The assisted suicide decisions are
used as illustrative throughout, and it will be helpful to begin with a fuller
account of the courts' reasoning in them.
I. THE ASSISTED SUICIDE DECISIONS
Although there have been a number of legislative proposals, including
the successful Oregon initiative, much discussion, and supportive articles
dating back at least fifteen years, 5 until last year no appellate decisions
had reached the question of whether there is a right to physician assist-
ance in dying. It was, therefore, absolutely stunning to have two of the
most highly respected federal courts of appeals conclude within weeks of
each other that state bans on- physician aid in dying are constitutionally
inpermissible. Despite involving challenges to similar statutes-general
bans on assisted suicide-the decisions are jurisprudentially quite
different.
The Ninth Circuit heard a challenge to the Washington state ban on
assisted suicide brought by physicians who treat terminally ill patients;
patients themselves terminally ill from cancer, AIDS, and emphysema;
and the non-profit organization, Compassion in Dying. The challenge
was upheld last March in an en banc rehearing. There were three central
steps to the en banc opinion. The first established the underlying right:
"a person who is terminally ill has a constitutionally-protected liberty in-
5. Alan L. Sullivan, A Constitutional Right to Suicide, in SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHI-
CAL ISSUES 229 (M. Pabst Battin & David J. Mayo eds., 1980).
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terest in hastening what might otherwise be a protracted, undignified, and
extremely painful death."' 6 The second concluded that the right out-
weighs interests asserted by the state.7 The third held that the Washing-
ton statute violates the Due Process Clause to the extent that it prohibits
physicians from prescribing life-ending medication to terminally ill, com-
petent adults. 8
In finding the protected liberty interest, the Ninth Circuit relied princi-
pally on what can best be characterized as a morally-charged reading of
the precedent set by the abortion and Cruzan9 decisions. The court's
analysis began by reading the abortion decisions, Roe10 and Casey," to
hold that a woman has a general liberty interest in securing an abortion, a
liberty interest in terms of which any restrictive legislation must be
judged. Viewing the elucidation of such liberty interests as a dynamic
process, the court then analyzed whether the considerations that sup-
ported the general abortion right also supported the general right to die.
Historical recognition of liberty interests, while demonstrative, is not de-
terminative of their importance. The court looked also to the impact of a
choice on a person's life, to the extent that the choice is constitutive of
identity and self-definition. In this analysis, the Ninth Circuit stated ex-
plicitly that it read Roe to establish a substantive right, and that it also
took itself to be recognizing a substantive right for the same underlying
moral reasons.' 2 The Ninth Circuit applied a parallel methodology to the
Cruzan decision's postulation of a liberty interest in terminating un-
wanted medical treatment, arguing that this interest "necessarily recog-
nizes a liberty interest in hastening one's own death.' 3 As additional
support for recognizing the liberty interest, the court also mentioned
changing public conceptions of the role of health care at the end of life.' 4
Finally, in emphasizing the fundamental nature of the right to die and the
intrusiveness of the Washington ban, the court retold tragic stories of the
suicides of terminally ill patients who were unable to arrange aid in
dying. 15
Against this liberty right, the Ninth Circuit arrayed five principal state
interests: preserving life, preventing suicide, avoiding improper influence
and pressure, protecting family members, and protecting the integrity of
the medical profession.' 6 It found all of these interests attenuated in the
case of competent, terminally ill patients. 17 The Ninth Circuit also con-
6. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 793.
7. Id. at 836-37.
8. Id. at 837.
9. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 801-02.
13. Id. at 816.
14. Id. at 821-22.
15. Id. at 834-35.
16. Id. at 816-17.
17. Id. at 816-30.
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sidered the possibility that through the door opened to some cases of
physician aid in dying would stream many other kinds of impermissible
practices. 18 However, the constitutionally permissible solution, in the
judgment of the Ninth Circuit, was not prohibition but regulation of aid
in dying.19
The dissenters challenged the majority's morally-charged reading of
precedent. 20 They read the Supreme Court as refusing to recognize new
fundamental liberty rights beyond those already found in history and tra-
dition.21 Judge Beezer's dissent was willing to agree that more general
liberty rights are found in Casey or Cruzan, but characterized them as
non-fundamental and subject to balancing against ordinary state inter-
ests.22 Judge Kleinfeld's dissent rejected the possibility of any substantive
due process claim not rooted in history or tradition.23 He also observed
that the judicial refusal to find such due process rights left open an invita-
tion to proponents of aid in dying to resort to the legislative process. 24
Compassion in Dying was decided in the limited en banc format per-
mitted by the Ninth Circuit. In their vigorous dissent from the order re-
jecting rehearing by the full Ninth Circuit, Judges O'Scannlain, Trott, and
Kleinfeld protested that the en banc panel's opinion was unprecedented.
The decision, the dissenters urged, "promulgat[ed] a new constitutional
right, one unheard of in over two hundred years of American history. '25
Although the panel claimed to be relying on precedent, it did so "by mis-
applying language uniquely crafted by the Supreme Court for application
in circumstances wholly inapposite. '26 The misapplication ostensibly
identified by the dissent lay in using the language of intimacy and per-
sonal choice to apply beyond abortion, to any decision-here, the deci-
sion about death-that involves an intimate and personal choice. 27 For
the dissent, what is crucially mistaken about this methodology is that it
ignores the role that historical legitimation has played in the recognition
of constitutional protection for liberties of personal choice. "The
Supreme Court has never recognized a substantive due process right
without first finding that there is a tradition of protecting that particular
interest. Here, there is absolutely no tradition of protecting assisted sui-
cide. ' '28 Further, the dissenters observed, the Compassion in Dying court
reached its decision despite the state's own rejection of an assisted suicide
initiative at the polls. 29
18. Id. at 830-32.
19. Id. at 832-33.
20. See id. at 848-49.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 849 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 857 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 858.
25. 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 1443.
27. Id. at 1444.
28. Id. at 1445.
29. Id. at 1446.
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Two central jurisprudential issues thus divide the majority and the dis-
senters. The first is how to read precedent. The majority extrapolated
new protections from underlying reasons. The dissent limited its analysis
to explicit historical recognition. The second is how to understand the
role of courts. The majority was willing for the court to take steps that the
dissent would have left to the legislature (or, by initiative, to the people).
These jurisprudential issues appear in different forms in the Second Cir-
cuit's assisted suicide decision issued less than a month later.30
Quill was brought by three physicians challenging the New York ban
on assisted suicide to the extent that it prohibited them from prescribing
life-ending medication to be self-administered by terminally ill patients.
One patient was terminally ill with thyroid cancer; the other two were in
the final stages of AIDS. The physicians contended that in these and
other cases the lethal prescriptions would be consistent with the stan-
dards of medical practice, but were forbidden by New York law. Unlike
patients who could choose to die by discontinuing life-sustaining therapy,
these patients had no legally available means to bring about their deaths.
The Second Circuit agreed with the Compassion in Dying dissent that
there is no constitutional liberty right to assisted suicide. 31 It considered
instead whether the state had interests that were rationally served by dis-
tinguishing treatment withdrawal from aid in dying.32
The Second Circuit concluded that the distinction between the patients
who could withdraw care and the patients who could not served no legiti-
mate state purpose.33 The court surveyed a number of possible legitimate
state purposes-allowing death to occur naturally, keeping physicians
from active involvement in causing death, preserving life-and concluded
that none corresponded with the ban in its present form.34 For example,
the court reasoned, there is as much active physician involvement in ter-
minating life-sustaining treatment and withdrawing therapy as there is in
writing a lethal prescription. 35 The potential for abuse is similar in either
case; the state's interest in preventing abuse is not served by the ban on
physician aid to competent, terminally ill patients alone-although it
might be furthered by stringent regulation of both treatment withdrawal
and aid in dying. 36
This line of reasoning can fairly be characterized as morally-charged
equal protection analysis. In deciding whether physician involvement in
termination of treatment decisions is relevantly similar to involvement in
prescribing lethal medications, the court looked to what it considered the
ethically relevant features of the two situations: what the physician does,
what his or her intentions are, what the results are, and whether abuse is
30. 80 F.3d at 724.
31. Id. at 724-25.
32. Id. at 729.
33. Id. at 727.
34. Id. at 729-30.
35. Id. at 729.
36. Id. at 731 n.4.
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likely. The court does not consider the historical understanding of the
two practices; however reasonable or unreasonable, the law has tradition-
ally made a distinction between withdrawing or withholding care, and as-
sisted suicide or euthanasia, characterizing assisted suicide as permissible
omission and euthanasia as impermissible action.
Judge Calabresi concurred in the result, agreeing that the statutory ban
could not stand in its present form.37 Calabresi's analysis relied on the
theory of adjudication he developed in A Common Law for the Age of
Statutes.38 According to Calabresi, courts in the modern era have been
too ready to rely on the Constitution to invalidate statutes. When the
rationale underlying a statute has atrophied, or the statute has become
obsolete, common law doctrines such as desuetude should weigh against
its enforcement. When statutes occupy territory near fundamental consti-
tutional protections-as all sides agree the suicide bans do-courts scruti-
nizing their validity should insist on "a present and positive
acknowledgment of the values that the legislators wish to further through
the legislation in issue."' 39  The original basis for the New York ban-
historically, the prohibition on aiding and abetting the crime of suicide-
has long since eroded, Calabresi contends. Suicide is no longer a crime.
The statutes date from the nineteenth century, and were not drafted with
modern medicine in mind. When statutes have fallen into disrepair, Cala-
bresi believes, the proper role for courts to play is to force legislative
reexamination. 40 Only if statutes are reenacted, with "a recent, affirma-
tive, lucid and unmistakable statement of why the state wishes to inter-
fere," 41 should courts reach the ultimate constitutional question.
Jurisprudentially, then, the Second Circuit sounds variations on the
themes of the Ninth Circuit. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit
refused to take historically recognized doctrine as determinative. It con-
siders instead whether alleged differences can be rationally grounded.
Like the Ninth Circuit dissenters, Judge Calabresi's concurrence centers
on the relative roles of courts and legislatures, albeit assigning a more
proactive role to the courts.
Different though they are, these are all surely plausible legal strategies.
With the exception of Judge Calabresi's methodology, they are standard
types of legal argument. Yet the Supreme Court is not going to be able to
adopt them all, and a great deal hinges on what the Court ultimately con-
cludes. At this juncture, can or should we expect any help from theories
of legal truth?
II. PATTERSON'S VIEW OF LEGAL TRUTH
For Patterson, the function of an account of legal truth is to move us
37. See id. at 732 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
38. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
39. Quill, 80 F.3d at 735 (Calabresi, J., concurring). "[I]nertia will not do." Id.
40. Id. at 742-743.
41. Id. at 741.
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somewhere beyond assertion, in his words "from assertion to truth. '42 A
theory of truth gives us a mechanism for sorting preferred legal assertions
(the true ones), from ones to be left aside (the false ones). So it might
seem that Patterson is poised to give a great deal of help in answering the
questions just posed: a way of distinguishing the true legal assertions in
the assisted suicide cases from the false ones. Patterson rejects, however,
any suggestion that the true claims are to be distinguished from the false
by their relation, correspondence or otherwise, to a reality external to the
processes of legal argument.43 Instead, Patterson develops an account of
legal truth rooted in the workings of legal practice; the discussion to fol-
low both develops and challenges this account. 44
Patterson begins with Philip Bobbitt's account of legitimacy in constitu-
tional interpretation. 45 Bobbitt's view (as presented by Patterson) is that
it is a mistake to demand a theory of constitutional legitimacy at all-a
general theory, that is, about whether courts should rely on original
meaning, historical development, substantive moral notions of privacy, or
anything else in deciding cases. The legitimacy of the assisted suicide
cases thus would not depend on whether they comport with a general
theory of originalism, or of natural law, or any other such theory. The
Compassion in Dying dissenters' complaint-that the majority had illegit-
imately postulated a right without historical grounding-would exemplify
this mistake of resorting to a theory of legitimacy. Bobbitt contends in-
stead that the claim to legitimacy of legal decisions such as these is not a
matter of overarching normative theory at all, but only a matter of
whether the decision at issue relies on recognized modalities of legal
argument.
According to Bobbitt, there are six recognized modalities of American
legal argument: history, text, constitutional structure, doctrine (in the
sense of rules generated by precedent), ethics (in the sense of the moral
commitments reflected in the Constitution), and cost/benefit analysis. 46
There is nothing more-and nothing less-to constitutional legitimacy
than the use of these six modalities. Legal arguments are in this sense
self-justifying: they are legitimate if they are recognizable as legal argu-
ments, illegitimate if they are not. There is nothing more ultimate or
foundational to be said.
Perhaps not, but there are certainly questions to be asked, and the as-
sisted suicide decisions are a helpful example. First, is it possible for the
modalities to be used incorrectly, and what are the standards for deter-
mining correct use of a modality? The majority and the dissent in Com-
passion in Dying appear to understand the modality of ethics differently.
The majority argues that there is a liberty right to autonomy in the most
42. PArrERSON, supra note 4, at 170.
43. See id. at 50-51.
44. See id. at 169-79.
45. See PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: A THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1992); PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
46. PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 136-37.
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important and intimate decisions affecting one's life. The dissent, and the
Second Circuit, understand constitutionally protected liberty to be cir-
cumscribed historically, including only those personal liberties that have
found recognition in American constitutional traditions. Is one use of the
modality of ethics to be preferred to the other? Could the conflicting
results that they yield be equally true? Or are there gaps in what can be
said about legal truth in highly controversial cases? Perhaps the claims of
the Ninth and the Second Circuits are neither true nor false, perhaps their
truth value is indeterminate until the Supreme Court speaks, or perhaps
their truth value will not even be determinate at that point.
Second, do the modalities interact and, if so, how? The view that the
moral account of liberty is historically bounded, for example, might be
regarded as the argument from precedent constraining the argument
from ethics. On the other hand, if there is to be room for a theory of
mistake in precedent, the constraints might go the other way. The histori-
cal failure to recognize rights to liberty in the manner of one's death, for
example, might be a flawed line of precedent if, as the Second Circuit
contends, these cases really are not significantly different from the cases
protecting the right to refuse treatment.
Finally, there are even questions about which modalities should be em-
ployed at all. In cases in which modalities conflict, is it arguable that one
should predominate over others, and on what basis? That one modality is
utterly inapposite? To get a sense of the extent of such conflicts, it is
worth reflecting that all of the arguments outlined in the account given
above of the aid in dying cases, with the exception of Judge Calabresi's
theory of statutory interpretation, are in wide use in American courts. In
dealing with these conflicts, is it arguable that some modalities are pre-
ferred, and others cannot be applied at all? For example, would cost/
benefit analysis, although a recognized modality, be out of place in the
right to die cases? Conversely, is Judge Calabresi's approach, which has
not gained general judicial recognition despite its scholarly interest,
thereby illegitimate? As presented by Patterson, Bobbitt has no general,
theoretical answer to these questions.47 There are apparently standards
set by each modality for what it is to be an argument within that modality,
but Patterson does not enlighten us about Bobbitt's further views along
these lines. Conflicts or questions of priority among modalities are to be
settled by resort to individual conscience. This space for individual con-
science to operate among the modalities is, for Bobbitt, how justice enters
into law. Patterson does not find this response satisfactory, either as a
theory about justice (since conscience and justice may not be the same),
47. Patterson does make a puzzling general claim at the end of his outline of Bobbitt,
however. After reiterating that nothing can be said about legitimacy beyond the modali-
ties, Patterson writes: "To the extent that these modalities are compromised or ignored,
particular decisions are illegitimate, and, over time, the legitimacy of the system as a whole
is undermined." PATrERSON, supra note 4, at 138. To be sure, acceptance of the system
might be undermined. But without standards for legitimacy beyond the modalities, it is
hard to see how legitimacy of the system itself might be compromised.
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or as a theory about legal decisions in hard cases (since the standards of
conscience might be subjective). Patterson develops instead his own more
complicated account of how the modalities of argument interrelate in law.
To develop his account, Patterson elaborates a structure for legal argu-
ments. Legal claims to truth must rest on grounds; grounds must be re-
lated to the claims they support by warrants.48 In Quill, "the New York
assisted suicide law is unconstitutional as applied to physicians writing
prescriptions for their competent, terminally ill patients," would be the
legal truth claim. The ground would be that terminally ill patients who
can choose to die by the discontinuation of life supports are relevantly
similar to terminally ill patients who cannot so avail themselves of the
means of death. The warrant would be the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Culturally endorsed forms of argument
would provide support for the use of the warrant. An example might be
the Second Circuit's use of ethical analysis to determine that the two
groups of patients are similarly situated. But as Patterson recognizes, the
story about backings is far more complicated than this. An objection to
the Second Circuit's Equal Protection analysis is that historically the law
has treated the discontinuation of life support quite differently from what
has been classified as active intervention in the dying process. Regardless
of whether the distinction makes moral sense, and that itself is contested,
it has had a considerable legal history. In Patterson's view, this should be
characterized as a conflict among warrants.
Such conflicts surely are at the center of constitutional dispute in hard
cases. To resolve them, Patterson resorts to metaphors of coherence
drawn from the work of Quine.49 To see the full impact of such meta-
phors, it is helpful to quote Patterson in full:
Quine's metaphor of science as "a total field of force" is the best
way to think about legal interpretation. Quine's contribution to the
philosophy of science was to suggest that "it is misleading to speak of
the empirical content of an individual statement." Likewise, in law,
it is misleading to speak of the truth of a proposition of law in isola-
tion from other propositions within the legal "web of belief."
In choosing between different interpretations, we favor those that
clash least with everything else we take to be true. In law, as in all
matters, "[w]e convince someone of something by appealing to be-
liefs he already holds and by combining these to induce further be-
liefs in him, step by step, until the belief we wanted finally to
inculcate in him is inculcated." In law, we choose the proposition
that best hangs together with everything else we take to be true.50
This is coherence theory applied to truth in law, with a vengeance. Of
the many issues raised by coherence theory, two are particularly troubling
for an account of truth in law. First, there may be more than one plausi-
48. Id. at 170.
49. W.V.O. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1960); W.V.O. QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL
POINT OF VIEW (1953).
50. PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 172 (footnotes omitted).
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ble reconstruction of the direction in which the law is moving. Indeed,
significant constitutional debates generally involve just such conflicts
among courts and commentators about legal direction. The constitu-
tional debate over the interpretation of liberty in the due process clause is
a case in point. One possibility is that the law in the area of liberties
protects a circumscribed list of historically recognized choices. On this
reading, Cruzan5' and Bowers52 are of a piece, with Bowers rejecting new
forms of sexual relationships and Cruzan assuming only the historical lib-
erty to turn down unwanted medical care. Casey,53 moreover, reached
the result it did only because Roe54 poked its nose under the tent early.
The other possibility reads the due process liberty cases as moving to-
wards a dynamic understanding of autonomy rights, protecting rights of
liberty in intimate personal decisions of deep life importance. This possi-
bility reads Cruzan as of an intellectual piece with Roe, both protecting
intimate liberties, and Bowers as at best an unfortunate anachronism re-
flecting outdated attitudes about sexual orientation.
The second difficulty is that Patterson's view just does not allow a the-
ory of legal truth to contribute significantly to these debates. In particu-
lar, it does not help in deciding which of several plausible reconstructions
is going in the-or at least a-"right way."'55 But there is surely more to
be said about truth in law than trend.
III. REALISM AND TRUTH IN LAW
On the realist idea defended here, a theory of legal truth should pro-
vide an account of what it is to get things more or less right, legally. Co-
herence pictures such as Patterson's can at best rely on acceptance and
fit: getting things right is a matter of getting them to mesh. When some-
thing does not mesh, it must be reshaped or discarded, or the framework
must be restructured to fit. How the fit is achieved will be a function of
which ideas are more persuasive or more powerful (or have more persua-
sive or more powerful proponents). Coherence theory cannot see getting
things right in terms of objective corrigibility. On the realist view, by
contrast, there are discoveries to be made, facts to be accounted for, er-
rors to be identified and corrected.
In recent philosophy, there has been much discussion of the possibili-
ties of realism. The realist enterprise for science is (roughly) to learn
what is true about the natural world. In ethics, the realist enterprise is to
try to figure out what is really right. Although the issues raised by objec-
tivity in science, ethics, and jurisprudence are surely different, the recent
discussions of realism in other fields are useful in understanding the pos-
sibilities afforded by a realist theory of legal truth.
51. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
52. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
53. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
54. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 178.
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The realist enterprise incorporates core semantic, metaphysical, and
epistemological commitments. 56 Realists claim, first, that the sentences
of their subject area (science, or ethics, or law), as literally understood,
have a truth value. That is, claims such as "there is a constitutional right
to choose the manner of one's death," are either true or false. They have
their truth value as literally understood-in this example, as about rights,
rather than as about rights reduced to other concepts, moral or non-
moral. A second central realist claim is that some propositions of the
type in question actually are true. The radical skepticism that asserts that
all ethical or all legal claims are false is itself misguided. For example, the
moral theorist John Mackie argued that all positive moral claims are false
because they purport to refer to moral properties in the universe that do
not exist; realists reject such claims of systematic error.57 So, too, would
they reject the claims of legal nihilists that all normative legal proposi-
tions are systematically biased and therefore false.58
More controversial than these claims about truth are realist claims
about metaphysics and epistemology. The core of realist metaphysics is
that there is a reality in some sense independent of the believer's beliefs
about it.59 This reality is the touchstone of corrigibility; it is in light of
belief-independent reality that propositions of science, ethics, or law must
be tested in the end. Of the many notorious difficulties for realists, per-
haps the hardest is filling in what this claim amounts to. What realities
are scientists, moral philosophers, or judges trying to "get right?" In the
history of moral philosophy, realism has been associated with the position
that there are real moral properties in the universe-perhaps Platonic
forms of justice, or the simple unanalyzeable quality "good."'60 This ver-
sion of moral realism has been adopted by some legal theorists in defense
of natural law. To the extent that it relies on the idea of a separate moral
realm, this position has drawn heavy criticism. 61 The moral theorist John
Mackie rejected moral realism, and what he understood as a parallel form
56. This account is based upon Peter Railton's recent, immensely helpful survey, and
David Brink's earlier book. See Peter Railton, Moral Relism: Prospects and Problems, in
MORAL KNOWLEDGE? NEW READINGS IN MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY (Walter Sinnott-Arm-
strong & Mark Timmons eds., 1996). See also DAVID 0. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND
THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1989).
57. J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977).
58. For example, Pierre Schlag argues that all normative legal scholarship is biased,
thus systematically in error. Pierre Schlag, Pre-Figuration and Evaluation, 80 CAL. L. REV.
965 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990).
59. For a discussion of difficulties in formulating this idea of mind-independence, see
Michael Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424, 2435 (1992). The basic
idea is that of a reality independent of what the particular thinker whose beliefs are at issue
believes (so that A's beliefs about society do not constitute social reality), rather than a
reality independent of minds altogether (so that social reality may be in part a function of
what members of society believe).
60. See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC; GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA
(1903).
61. For a discussion of these issues, see Michael Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90
MICH. L. REV. 2424 (1992). Moore defends a naturalist realism, but is in many ways sym-
pathetic to the stronger and more problematic forms of realism. For example, Moore holds
that reality is "gapless," so every proposition is true or false. Id. at 2437. He thus leaves no
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of natural law theory, because he understood realism as committed to
"queer" moral properties that both attach to states of affairs in the world
and motivate human action.62 Realists certainly owe their critics a plausi-
ble metaphysics. But there are many less problematic accounts of the
ontological commitments of realism in law particularly, about which more
in a moment.
Epistemologically, realists hold that knowledge consists in "getting
things right." They offer, however, many different accounts of what it is
to get things right, and to be justified in believing that one has succeeded
in doing so. An important epistemological distinction in these discussions
of realism is that of the difference between knowledge and justified be-
lief. Knowledge involves, roughly, holding beliefs that are true and hold-
ing them for the right reasons-getting things right, and not doing so by
accident. Justification involves being in an epistemically favorable posi-
tion with respect to the beliefs one holds, with the recognition that one
might nonetheless be wrong. Realist accounts of knowledge are typically
linked to realist metaphysical views; knowledge is the correct understand-
ing of reality, obtained in a dependable way. Accounts of justification, at
one remove from accounts of knowledge, seek reliable ways of identify-
ing when one is in a position to think that one knows. But realists offer
many different accounts of when this might be so, including accounts that
are not directly linked to realist metaphysics.
In developing accounts of justification, some realists do defend the pos-
sibility of access to a mind-independent reality, arguing that beliefs are
not justified unless there is reason to believe one is in a position to
achieve this epistemic access. Others do not seek access to a mind-in-
dependent reality. David Brink, for example, argues that justification in
ethics is a matter of coherence among carefully considered claims (both
moral and nonmoral). The contrasting view about justification, which
Brink rejects, is that justification is foundationalist: beliefs are justified if
they are themselves privileged foundations, or if they are related in ap-
propriate evidentiary or inferential ways to epistemically privileged foun-
dations.63  Realists have been drawn to foundationalism about
justification because they have thought it was a way to guarantee "contact
with reality," through foundational beliefs. To the contrary, Brink argues
that coherence is the best explanation available for the possibility that
beliefs accurately represent the world.64 Brink thus adheres to a coheren-
tist picture of justification as wide reflective equilibrium, a view espoused
by a number of contemporary moral theorists. 65 Still others present dif-
room for the possibility that a legal claim would have an indeterminate truth value until,
for example, a court has acted.
62. See generally MACKIE, supra note 57.
63. See generally BRINK, supra note 56; see also John Rawls, Outline of a Decision
Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHIL.' REV. 177 (1951) (examining a reasonable decision proce-
dure for adjudication of competing ethical interests).
64. BRINK, supra note 56, at 125.
65. See, e.g., Robert Audi, Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics, in
MORAL KNOWLEDGE? NEW READINGS IN MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY 101 (Walter Sinnott-
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ferent arguments against committing the realist to foundationalist views
about justification. If access to an external reality-"things in them-
selves"-is not possible, the feminist critic Naomi Scheman argues, rely-
ing on such reality is of no use to the social critic.66 Instead, as a way of
correcting bias in beliefs and achieving objectivity in justification,
Scheman suggests attention to whether different and challenging voices
have been heard and considered.67 Realists can thus hold many different
views about when believers are in epistemically favored positions. Where
they agree is in ultimately linking their theories of justification to realist
accounts of knowledge and metaphysics, in roughly the following way:
being justified in believing is a matter of being in a good position to have
knowledge, and having knowledge is being justified in having beliefs
about the world that are true.
In law, perhaps even more so than in ethics, there are a number of
possible accounts of what legal actors might be trying to get right. One
helpful initial observation is that courts rely on many claims about ordi-
nary-that is, non-legal or non-moral--facts. There is, of course, the evi-
dence in the case, but there are other facts as well. Consider some
examples of ordinary fact claims made in the assisted suicide decisions.
The Ninth Circuit, as a basis for recognizing a liberty interest in physician
aid in dying, asserted that practice of physician aid in dying is in fact
widespread.68 The Second Circuit, in rejecting the distinction between
withdrawal of treatment and aid in dying, asserted that patients who can-
not avail themselves of treatment withdrawal frequently die in pain.69
Judge Calabresi, in concluding that New York's ban on assisted suicide
rested on a rationale atrophied by time, contended that the New York
legislature had not recently reexamined the statute in light of contempo-
rary concerns.70 All of these are fact claims that are crucial to the reason-
ing presented. Furthermore, these were all contested in briefs filed with
the Supreme Court in the appeals. Both the judges who relied on them
and the critics who contested them assumed that the fact claims are, in
principle, subject to empirical scrutiny. It may be that one of the follow-
ing is true: there are very few committed patients who cannot find their
own means of death; few patients die in pain with properly used modern
methods of pain control; or the New York legislature had indeed scruti-
nized New York's laws regarding end-of-life decisionmaking. To the ex-
Armstrong & Michael Timmons eds., 1996); Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium
and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 J. PHIL. 256 (1979); Rawls, supra note 62.
66. NAOMI SCHEMAN, ENGENDERINGS: CONSTRUCTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE, AUTHOR-
ITY, AND PRIVILEGE (1993).
67. See generally id.
68. This claim is made in Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 828; and disputed in Brief of
the American Geriatrics Society as Amicus Curiae, Washington v. Glucksburg (No. 96-
110).
69. This claim is disputed in Brief of the American Medical Association as Amicus
Curiae, Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996) (No. 95-7028).
70. But see NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS
SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994); NEW
YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE (1992).
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tent that it depends on such claims of fact, the reasoning in the decisions
stands or falls on the underlying facts of the matter. Thus, the next step is
to ask why the reasoning about the law in the cases should be any
different.
In determining what it is that the courts might be trying to get right in
putting forth legal claims, there are a number of leading candidates.
Each rests on a more general picture of the nature of the legal enterprise.
Each would urge answering questions about what the law is in a way that
goes beyond coherence, although in different directions. These can use-
fully be grouped into three categories: ordinary facts, facts about the law,
and moral facts. A brief discussion of each follows, using the assisted
suicide cases as illustrations.
First are the ordinary facts. Beyond the facts of the case at hand,
'judges, in deciding cases, might be trying simply to get ordinary facts
right. These might be facts about human well-being, about institutional
stability, or about social progress. Defenders of what was called "socio-
logical jurisprudence" in the early twentieth century, for example, sug-
gested that judges should try to further social progress.71 To take another
example, in The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart discusses the relationship
between basic human needs and the continuing existence of a legal sys-
tem.72 Hart believes that legal systems that do not take into account such
facts as that humans are physically vulnerable to threats will not long
endure. He does not believe that there are conceptual links between
these facts and the existence of a legal system, but he does think that, as a
contingent matter, accounting for such facts is part of the ongoing func-
tion of a legal system.73
The assisted suicide decisions contain many examples of the courts try-
ing to get right facts about human well-being and social stability. Perhaps
the principal one is the anticipated impact on society of the recognition of
such a right. The Ninth Circuit considers and rejects the possibility that
recognizing a constitutional right to aid in dying will risk a slide down a
slippery slope to nonvoluntary euthanasia. 74 In arguing for reversal, how-
ever, some amici contend that recognition of assisted suicide would be
dangerous social policy. 75 In a very recent decision regarding the Oregon
law permitting aid in dying, the Ninth Circuit has reiterated the view that
it will not lead to a parade of social horribles.76 The courts here are, quite
simply, trying to understand the social effects of legal policy.
Second are facts about the law. The idea that there are facts about the
law, which judges are trying to get right, is the central idea of legal posi-
71. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
72. See generally id.
73. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
74. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 830.
75. See, e.g., Brief of American Suicide Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
versal, Washington v. Glucksburg (No. 96-110); Brief of Family Research Council as Ami-
cus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksburg (No. 96-110).
76. Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
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tivism. Positivists differ about the existing kinds of legal facts. The prin-
cipal candidates are facts about precedent, facts about rules, and
institutional facts. Positivists also differ about whether legal facts are
available in every case or the law runs out at times.
One kind of legal fact that judges might be trying to get right are facts
about what courts have decided or will decide. A particularly conserva-
tive view is that judges are trying to get facts about precedent in prior
cases right; this views the law as static and stable. The extreme realist
view (that law is nothing other than a prediction about what courts will
do) is another example of the idea that the law consists in facts about
judicial decisionmaking. 77 Dispute about the identification and impor-
tance of precedent is clearly apparent in the assisted suicide cases. The
Compassion dissenters believe that the role of the courts is to follow ex-
isting precedent with respect to constitutional liberty rights, but not to
identify new rights.
A second possibility is that judges are trying to get the rules of law
right. On a formalist view, the law is made up of a set of rules, and the
enterprise of judging is to "find" the applicable rules for any given case.
On the "model of rules," as developed by H.L.A. Hart, judges attempt to
identify the rules that are relevant to a given case by reference to a
master rule, the "rule of recognition." There may, however, be cases in
which the law runs out and the judge must call upon extra-legal consider-
ations in making a decision.78 The effort to identify rules of law in the
assisted suicide cases is found in the dispute over whether there is a rec-
ognized liberty right that includes control over the manner of one's dying.
Another possibility is that these are genuine "hard cases" of the type
identified by Hart, in which there is no clear law to apply and judges must
make new law. If so, there would be no legal truth of the matter until a
definitive ruling has been obtained.
Yet another view is that judges are trying to get institutional arrange-
ments right. A principal example of this view is conventionalism: judges
are trying to reproduce the institutional understandings of society. Such
conventions may go beyond the identified rules of law relied upon by
Hart.79 Legal claims can get the conventions right, or they can be mis-
taken about them.80 Several examples of the view that courts are trying
to get institutions right are found in the assisted suicide cases. One exam-
ple is the dispute over the relative roles of courts and legislatures in iden-
tifying rights, as the Ninth Circuit believes that it is appropriate for courts
to elaborate rights under the due process clause and the dissent believes
it is not. Another example is Judge Calabresi's claim that when near-
constitutional issues are at stake, the role of courts is to insist on contem-
77. For identification of this view with extreme realism, see MARTIN P. GOLDING, PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW 37-39 (1975) (explaining the prediction theory of Holmes).
78. See generally HART, supra note 73.
79. For an account of conventionalism, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
80. Of course, the conventions can run out too, in which case there is nothing to get
right and the claims are neither true nor false.
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porary endorsements of statutory limits by legislatures.8 ' These are sig-
nificant disputes about the actual design of American institutions as they
have been evolving since World War II.
A third realist possibility is that judges are trying to get moral facts
right. This view is exemplified in the varieties of the natural law tradition.
Some versions of natural law theory link law to accepted moral views.
Ronald Dworkin, for example, holds that right answers in legal cases are
those which follow from the soundest view of the settled law. 82 Lon
Fuller's purposive theory of adjudication linked law and morality by
viewing legal institutions as the enterprise of subjecting human conduct
to the governance of rules. 83 Still others hold that adjudication rests on
getting facts about morality right. Michael Moore, for example, writes:
[J]udges interpreting the Constitution are not merely asserting their
own will, nor are they merely reflecting a societal consensus; rather,
when judges decide what process is due a citizen, or what equality
requires, or when a punishment is cruel, they judge a moral fact as
capable of being true or false. When interpreting the provisions of
the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments, they make judg-
ments about the moral rights persons possess, rights that those Con-
stitutional provisions did not create but only named.84
There are examples of efforts to get morality right in the assisted sui-
cide cases, too. One example is the contention by the Second Circuit that
there is no defensible moral distinction between withdrawing and with-
holding care.85 This contention is disputed by briefs of amici including
the United States.86 Another example is the role of the physician, with
the Ninth Circuit seeing the role of the physician in terms of alleviating
suffering,87 and its critics arguing that active participation in taking a life
conflicts with the physician's role as healer.88 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
waxes eloquent about changing social attitudes about the moral permissi-
bility of suicide, 89 a discussion sharply criticized in the amicus briefs. 90
Finally, why does it matter whether the enterprise of identifying law is
understood in realist terms? Considering what adjudication tries to get
right brings out the different pictures of the nature of law itself that un-
derlie different theories of adjudication. Law can be viewed as an enter-
81. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 38; see also Quill, 80 F.3d at 735 (Calabresi,
J., concurring).
82. See generally DWORKIN, supra note 79.
83. See generally LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1961).
84. Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424, 2470 (1992)
(footnote omitted).
85. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729 (citing Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die
with Assistance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2028-31 (1992)).
86. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Quill v. Vacco
(No. 95-1858).
87. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 829.
88. E.g., Brief for the American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Quill v. Vacco (No. 95-1858).
89. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 810-12.
90. E.g., Brief of American Suicide Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Rever-
sal, Washington v. Glucksburg (No. 96-110).
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prise of social engineering, self-replication, social stability, or moral
rectitude. Debates about complex constitutional issues such as assisted
suicide bring these different models of law into play. Identifying the
range of available possibilities in realist terms helps bring these different
models to light. These kinds of disputes, however, are never forced into
the open when the goal is coherence.
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